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CONCEPT IDENTIFICATION;
POST FEEDBACK VARIATION IN THE BRAIN DAMAGED
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The many problems of studying thinking and thought 
processes are as formidable as any one can choose to 
tackle. In fact, as Hebb states,
The failure of psychology to handle thought ade­
quately has been the essential weakness of modern 
psychological theory (1949, p. 16).
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) have also 
recognized this point in their discussion of the revival 
of interest in the study of cognitive processes. They 
attribute this revival to a recognition of the complex 
processes that mediate between the classical "stimulus" 
and "response" out of which S-R learning had hoped to 
fashion a psychology that would by-pass anything sounding 
"mental." The strict "S-R bond" concept was to become 
modified into a concept that has been called an "S-O-R" 
concept; the 0 standing for all the subtle events that 
may occur between the input of a physical stimulus and 
the emission of an observable response. Other sources 
of the revival are the development of information theory
after the communication model and a decline in interest in 
the unyielding determinism inherent in the Freudian view 
of human behavior.
A further factor that has called attention of psy­
chologists to these central processes of thinking is the 
realization by experimentalists working with animals that 
perception and learning are not wholly peripheral and 
self-sufficient processes, but that even at the minimal 
level they are complicated by generalization and transfer. 
It is now generally realized that no sharp dividing line 
can be drawn between generalization and transfer at the 
sensori-motor level and conceptual thinking. As Piaget 
points out, "Intelligence is not a completely new power 
superimposed all of a sudden on completely prepared prev­
ious mechanisms, but is only the expression of these same 
mechanisms when they go beyond present and immediate con­
tact with the world"(1957, p. 85). Fields (1932) in 
demonstrating that, after training, rats could eventually 
discriminate any kind of triangle in any position from 
other figures, went on to suggest that they had attained 
the concept of triangularity. Pavlov's (1927) stimulus 
generalization, Lashley's (1934) equivalent stimuli, 
Harlow's (1949) learning sets lead away from the assump­
tion of a sensory dominance of behavior and toward the 
acceptance of autonomous central processes. An important
aspect of these central processes is that they are con­
cerned with sorting, classifying, ordering, abstracting-- 
with the operations, therefore, that are characteristic 
of conceptual thinking. As Hunt has recently stated, 
"Understanding how humans learn abstractions is essential 
to the understanding of human thought" (1962, p. 1).
Although concepts are the principal tools of 
thinking and were among the first psychological problems 
to be investigated by the ancient Greeks, especially the 
platonic Socrates, they have been the subjects of fewer 
investigations than have some other cognitive processes 
such as sensation, perception, imagery, serial learning, 
and retention. Among the classic works on concept forma­
tion are those of Kulpe (see Wilcocks, 1925), English 
(1922), Fisher (1916), Hull (1920), and Smoke (1932,
1933, 1935). Smoke gives us a summative statement con­
cerning this earlier work on concepts.
Prior to 1920 all of the experimental work on 
concepts was carried on by means of an introspective 
technique. This work, though careful and painstak­
ing, is so lacking in objectivity (in the sense of 
which the natural sciences are objective) that it 
seems to us to be of little value today (1935, 
p. 274).
The first important non-introspective attempt to 
study concept learning was that of Hull (1920). Hull was 
also to summarize the earlier work as being "introspective 
in method, analytic in purpose, and qualitative in result"
(1920, p. 1). This work investigated the comparative econ­
omy of the simple-to-complex method versus the complex-to- 
simpie method, moderate familiarity with a certain number 
of concepts versus thorough familiarity with half as many, 
drawing special attention to the common elements versus 
equal distribution of attention to all parts, and the 
influence of psychotic conditions. Hull considered his 
^s to have "evolved" a concept when they discovered the 
"common element" hidden in each member of a group of 
Chinese characters. Each character in a given group had 
this common element in a sense that it contained certain 
strokes in common with the other characters of the group, 
and the process of discovering these common elements was 
taken to be "the evolution of concepts." As Hull states:
All of the individual experiences which require 
a given reaction, must contain certain characteristics 
which are to all members of the group requiring this 
reaction and which are not found in any number of the 
groups requiring different reactions (1920, p. 13).
Smoke (1932) took issue with Hull and his view of 
a concept on the grounds of it being over-simplified and 
elementaristic. He criticized Hull and those who contin­
ued his work (Gengerelli, 1927; Kuo, 1923) for leaving 
out the "relationship" involved in the stimulus complex.
The criticism is essentially concerned with the Gestaltist- 
Behavioristic split. If one divorces himself from this 
controversy, the two dissertations of Hull and Smoke can
be seen as similar. Both used nonsense words as well as 
the discrimination of certain common aspects of a stimulus 
pattern in their experimental definition of the concept. 
Smoke's classic definition of concept formation is often 
quoted:
By "concept formation," "generalization," or 
"concept learning," we refer to the process whereby 
an organism develops a symbolic response (usually, 
but not necessarily linguistic) which is made to the 
members of a class of stimulus patterns but not to 
other stimuli (1932, p, 8).
Smoke's work used geometric design patterns of 
differing shape, color, position, width of lines, and 
number. His investigation was concerned mainly with the 
investigation of positive as compared to negative instances 
as well as the relationship between intelligence and the 
ability to identify concepts.
Hull and Smoke can provide a point of departure in 
several respects:
(1) They both attempted an objective, more quanti­
tative investigation of the process in question.
(2) Hull suggested that the study of concept think­
ing in psychopathology may be fruitful.
(3) Smoke suggested that basic dimensions such as 
shape, color, number, and position as useful conceptual 
dimensions.
In 1934 the Russian psychologist Vigotsky, on the 
basis of clinical observations and experiments, put forward
the theory that the characteristic feature of schizo­
phrenia was the loss of the ability to think in abstract 
concepts and a regression to a more primitive level which 
he called "thinking in complexes." His test, which was a 
modification of one developed by Asch, used blocks of , 
varying shapes, colors, and sizes that were to be placed 
in categories in relation to the concept in question. 
Vigotsky's work was followed up by Hanfmann and Kasanin 
(1942) in the United States. This work was based on the 
assumption that one's ability to form and test miniature 
theories or concepts is.the highest form of thinking. And 
the placing of blocks into groups according to a classifi­
cation principle is the specific indicator of this form 
of thinking.
Probably the most celebrated and influencial work­
er using a concept formation test consisting of blocks of 
different form, shape, and color is Kurt Goldstein. In 
fact, Hanfmann and Kasanin (1937) credit Goldstein with 
having termed what they call the very core of conceptual 
thinking, the "categorical attitude." A second aspect 
they mention, "insight into the multiple possibilities of 
the choice," also sounds very much like Goldstein's dis­
cussion of shift in thinking. In short, it can be seen 
that on theoretical grounds, at least, there is a great 
similarity between the Hanfmann-Kasanin and the Goldstein
tests. In their classic.monograph Goldstein and Scheerer 
(1941) described a number of sorting tests using a variety 
of-objects including blocks, skeins of wool, and everyday 
objects (pipe, nail, pencil, etc.) that can be sorted into 
groups that reflect conceptual dimensions of color, shape, 
size, and category names like "tools." These tests became 
the standards by which conceptual deficit was observed in 
brain damaged. Indeed, even though the form of various 
tests have changed, still the basic dimensions of size, 
color, shape, and number remain standards in research on 
conceptual thinking.
Memory Function in Psychopathology.--In any review 
of the literature concerning cognitive deficit in psycho­
pathology the importance of the assessment of the memory 
function soon becomes apparent. In fact, the degree to 
which the memory function is contributing in any kind of 
psychological test assessment is not really known. At an 
even more general level there is hardly a task, be it 
intellectual or otherwise, that does not, to some extent, 
draw on the human capacity to store and retrieve informa­
tion and experience. As Kraeplin stated long ago:
All higher mental activity depends largely on 
memory. The formation of concepts is the necessary 
condition for the fullest development of ideation 
(in Halstead, 1947, p. 15).
A wealth of clinical observation and research have
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for many years suggested that loss of memory is one of the 
most salient symptoms of brain injury (Benton, 1946; Stone, 
Gridner, § Albrecht, 1946; Wechsler, 1945). Goldstein also 
listed as a component of the concrete attitude the inabil­
ity to hold in mind simultaneous aspects of a particular 
task. This inability can be thought of as reflecting a 
recent memory deficit.
One of the most popular traditional measures of 
recent memory deficit is the digit span test where the 
subject repeats increasing series of digits presented one 
second apart. The subject is asked to repeat them forward 
and backward. This test, as one indicator of recent mem­
ory, has been found, with varying degrees of success, to 
be indicative of cerebral pathology (Allan, 1947, 1948; 
Anderson, 1951; Collins, 1951; Diers § Brown, 1950; McFie 
§ Piercy, 1952). Heilbrun (1956) using a variety of mem­
ory tasks found very different performance in the brain 
damaged group. Subtest breakdown on the digit span re­
vealed a significantly greater deficit in the patients 
with left sided lesions as opposed to right sided lesions. 
This was part of the larger finding of a greater deficit 
in verbal abilities with left sided lesions. Whether 
this memory deficit is a result of a disturbance of the 
neural trace or storage mechanism is not clear. There are 
many studies that have established a relationship between
anxiety or stress and digit span performance (Blankenship, 
1938; Calvin, 1955; Keyes, 1953; Moldawsky, e;t al., 1952). 
This work suggests that the recent memory function tapped 
by the digit span test is sensitive to or can be lowered 
by induced stress or anxiety. Of course there is no 
reason to suggest an either-or situation. Both vari­
ables could conceivably contribute to a reduction of 
storage capacity in any particular instance. In fact, 
Goldstein states that the "catastrophic" anxiety that 
is so debilitating is primarily a reaction of the patient 
to his inadequate performance. Part of this inadequate 
performance could certainly be a memory loss.
Memory Deficit in the Mentally Retarded.--The 
interpretation of inadequate functioning of the mentally 
retarded in terms of memory functions has been proposed 
by Ellis (1963). It is called the "stimulus trace 
theory" and is invoked as an explanatory mechanism to 
account for immediate memory. The theory is fashioned 
after Hebb (1949) and postulates "reverberatory cir­
cuits" as the basis of short term memory. These cir­
cuits, which do not initially entail a change in neural 
structure, are felt to be the most sensitive to CNS 
disturbance. Ellis cites a .considerable number of stud­
ies that lend support for phis theory and concludes.
Evidence from neurophysiology supports the notion
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of a reverberatory,circuit and the role of persever- 
ative aftereffects in short-term memory. These 
considerations along with empirical findings from 
the research with animals lend appeal to the stimulus 
trace concept and to its promise as an explanatory 
construct for behavioral differences resulting from 
CNS insult in the human (1963, p. 138).
This research is viewed in support of the consid­
eration of memory functions in the evaluation of the 
performance of Ss with CNS damage.
Memory, Brain Function, Concept Formation.--As
Mark suggested, one of the most distinguishing behaviors
to be found in the Mgher organisms is that of more
efficient problem solving or, quite synonymously, concept
formation. This behavior
permits the system not only to classify within-brain 
activity patterns of the basis of operational equiv­
alence but also to classify external stimulus pattern 
similarities and differences by the same operational 
criteria. This allows for the possibility of sub­
stituting one external pattern for another, and 
therefore, for conditioned intra- and inter-modality 
discrimination (1962, p. 77).
Both of these classification activities depend on the
ability to code and retain both spatial and temporal
patterns.
One of the most extensive investigations of both 
brain function and memory deficit has been done by 
Talland (1965). Over the years his investigations of 
Korsakoff's Disease have been designed to test specific 
hypotheses about disturbances characteristic of the
11%
amnesic syndrome and, indirectly, the processes involved 
in normal memory function. The results of his studies 
using tasks such as those used by Goldstein, Hanfmann, 
and Kasanin, Halstead, etc., plus many other categorical, 
perceptual, and sequential tasks reveal a singular 
deficit in the brain injured or Korsakoff patient.
Talland summarizes this work by stating that.
Impaired memory function certainly hampered 
their concept attainment, particularly when the 
examples drawn from a class were presented ser­
ially, but reluctance to adopt alternative cri­
teria also contributed to their ineffective per­
formance (1965, p. 199).
Talland also states that his work fits Gold­
stein's theory of brain damage where the patient is 
performing at a level of reduced complexity, in a con­
crete rather than an abstract or symbolic fashion. The 
Korsakoff patients revealed strong tendencies to adopt 
the concrete attitude which was part of their general 
orientational inflexibility.
CHAPTER II
MATHEMATICAL THEORY AND CONCEPT IDENTIFICATION
The application of mathematics in the biological 
and social sciences is neither so widespread nor so 
successful up to the present time as it has been in the 
physical sciences. However, one area that has been 
shown to be well adapted to mathematical treatment is 
that of learning. Relationships expressed in the form 
of learning curves or retention curves can be easily 
expressed by equations. Ebbinghaus as early as 1885 
developed a retention curve roughly logarithmic in form. 
Ebbinghaus used the procedure that has since come to be 
known as empirical curve-fitting. When one follows this 
procedure, he first plots the empirical data and then 
looks for a mathematical function to fit it. The main 
point in empirical curve-fitting is that we select the 
curve family solely on the basis of fit and not on the 
basis of theory. If the curve is selected on the basis 
of theory it is called rational curve-fitting. In the 
development of mathematical theory, it soon became 
apparent that the development of rational curve-fitting 
would be necessary if mathematics was to best serve
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psychological theory. An advance in the application of 
mathematical thinking to learning was made by Thurstone 
(1930a,. 1930b) when he based his equations on a theory 
as to how learning takes place. What happens, according 
to.Thurstone, is that the learner performs a number of 
acts per unit of time. His attainment can be stated as 
the probability that one of these acts will be success­
ful.
The next major development in rational curve- 
fitting in learning came with the work of Hull, et al., 
(1940) with his vigorous mathematical theorizing and 
symbolic logic. As we saw earlier, Hull was already 
active in the field of concept formation and thinking 
processes and his work has become synonymous with the 
most rigorous quantitative methods.
Another attempt to handle thinking processes in 
a quantitative fashion, based on the systematic analysis 
of human communication, has acquired the name of "infor- 
mation-theory" (Shannon § Weaver, 1949). This communi­
cation model suggests that psychological events can be 
understood through analogy with the events that occur 
when a.message is transmitted through an electronic 
transmission system.
The usefulness of information theory has been 
its attempt to provide a unit by which information can
14
be measured. This unit of information is defined in 
terms of how much uncertainty is reduced by a-selection 
of an alternative. The more alternatives there are, the 
more information is conveyed by each choice. The rela­
tion of information to number of alternatives is given 
more formal expression; the amount of information 
yielded by specifying one of a number of alternatives 
increases as the logarithm of number of alternatives.
The formula is simply:
Number of Guesses Required = Log2 Number of Alternatives
This is the model used for information theory. 
The unit of information is called the "bit," which is a 
condensation of "binary digit," and refers to two choice 
situations. The "bit" of information is the unit of 
information gained whenever the number of alternatives 
is reduced by one-half. If a message reduces the number 
of alternatives R to some fraction R/X, then the amount 
of information in the message is log2 X bits.
One of the first applications of information 
theory to concept learning was by Hovland (1952) where 
he re-analyzed the studies of Smoke (1932, 1933) with 
regard to the preference of positive as opposed to neg­
ative instances in concept identification (the prefer­
ence for cues relevant to what the concept rather
15
than to what it ^  not), His findings (to be discussed 
later) and conclusions based on the information analysis 
approach did much to stimulate research in thinking 
processes in general and concept identification in 
particular.
A combination of mathematical theorizing (Restle, 
1955, 1957, 1958) and information theory techniques has 
been developed by.Bourne and Restle (1959) and deals ex­
plicitly with concept learning problems. It has been 
called a cue conditioning and a stimulus sampling theory. 
The basic notion concerns the number of relevant cues 
in any given universe of stimuli (defined by a problem); 
the greater the number of relevant cues in the universe, 
then the greater is the probability of selecting one or 
more of these in any sample. This greater probability 
leads to faster solutions to the problem. As Hunt 
states :
Stimuli are specified by binary dimensions, 
each dimension indicating the presence or absence 
of a particular set of cues. In a two-choice prob­
lem, each dimension is either relevant (in the 
sense that one of its values is always associated 
with the appropriate name) or irrelevant. Thus, 
the discovery of any one of the relevant dimensions 
transmits sufficient information for the subject to 
make the appropriate discrimination (1962, p. 58).
In this formulation the theoretical parameters 
are derived mathematically and are based on probability 
statements. For instance, the probability of a correct
16
response on the Nth trial is P(n), assuming no response 
biases and no adapted cues, is given by the following 
formula
1/2
(1) P(n> = 1 - r+(l-r) (1-ep-l
where r equals the number of relevant cues in the uni­
verse (the problem) and 0 equals the product of the 
probability of a particular response being reinforced 
and the probability that a relevant cue will be present. 
One can see by the number of r components in the denom­
inator that as r increases the probability of a correct 
response increases. Another way of stating this--that 
when the proportion of relevant cues increases, so does 
the probability of making a correct response on any 
single trial.
As Hunt states, the only variable in the equa­
tion for P(n) which is not under the control of the 
experimenter is r, the proportion of relevant cues in 
the universe of stimulus elements. This value must be 
estimated from the total number of errors ; that is, 
must be derived empirically from initial d a t a I n  this 
sense, the scheme involves both rational and empirical 
methods of describing the learning function. In formula 
form (1962, p . 60):
17
kR
(2) r = -----:—
CR+I+C)
where the k equals the number of relevant cues, R equals 
the number of relevant dimensions in the problem, I the 
number of irrelevant dimensions, and C the total of all 
uncorrelated cues arising from background stimuli; then 
we see that only k and C must be determined empirically. 
Once these values are determined, the model can be used 
to predict difficulty of concept learning with various 
combinations of relevant and irrelevant information.
Complexity.-rIn concert with the investigation 
of variables relevant to solution processes, we arrive 
at a consideration of the complexity of the stimulus 
situation and its effect on cue utilization. In the 
mathematical theory of concept identification (Bourne G 
Restle, 1959) solutions of concept tasks are presumed 
to be related to the number of relevant cues in the 
stimulus situation. The cues, in turn, are represented 
in part by the number of relevant and irrelevant dimen­
sions which together define the conceptual task. It 
is assumed that the measure of relevant cues is propor­
tional to the number of relevant dimensions, and the 
measure of irrelevant cues from dimensions alone is 
proportional to the number of dimensions made irrelevant.
18
The complexity of the task can now be defined in terms 
of the ratio of irrelevant to relevant dimensions: the
greater the ratio, the greater the complexity. The 
mathematical presentation of this concept was given 
earlier and it can be seen to be one of the most basic 
and verified variables in the theory. The advancement 
is the ability to define quantitatively difficulty 
levels independent of the subject's response, a peren­
nial problem in the area of learning and problem solving,
This dimension of complexity as described here 
was being utilized before Bourne and Restle's (1959) 
theoretical presentation. For instance, Hovland and 
Weiss (1953) although studying particularly the relative 
informational content of positive as opposed to negative 
instances did also include a variation in the ratio of 
relevant to irrelevant dimensions. Investigation of 
their data with this in mind reveals a decrement in per­
formance as the ratio of relevant to irrelevant became 
smaller.
Archer, Bourne, and Brown (1955) modified the 
Hovland and Weiss techniques and performed two experi­
ments in which complexity was the central consideration. 
In the first experiment, using 2 bits of relevant infor­
mation and 1, 2, and 3 bits irrelevant, means scores of 
70.5, 101.0, and 173.8 were obtained for complexity
19
levels o£ 1, 2, and 3 respectively. These were signifi­
cantly different on the linear component only. In the 
second experiment five levels (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 irrele^ 
vant dimensions) were used and both the linear and the 
quadratic components were significant. One of their 
conclusions in this regard is that:
Performance in concept identification degraded 
as a positive exponential function of amount of 
irrelevant information measured in bits (Archer, 
Bourne, § Brown, 1955, p. 164),
With the establishment of the complexity dimen­
sion the future work was inevitably to be concerned 
with the verification as well as the investigation of 
it in relation to other variables in concept identifi­
cation. Bourne (1957), for instance, investigated the 
delay of information feedback (the period from the time 
a decision response is made until the indication of 
correctness or incorrectness is made) and complexity 
in a 6 X 3 factorial design. Both main effects were 
found to be significant sources of variance but the pre­
dicted interaction (a greater divergence at each level 
of complexity as the delay interval increased) was not 
observed. The explanation offered was the restricted 
range of delay intervals (.0 to 8.0 secs.).
Pishkin (1961) investigated three levels (1, 3,
5 bits) of complexity and its relationship to response 
tendenciesi The response tendency groups were defined
20
by their own tendency to choose one of two keys in 
response to a stimulus presentation where "neither a 
right nor a wrong choice" was possible. Each S had 3 
trials to determine his tendency group placement. Again 
the main effects (complexity and response tendency) were 
significant. But again we fail to find a differential 
effect of a response tendency as the problem becomes 
more complex.
It should be noted at this time that in all of 
these experiments (Archer, et , 1955; Bourne, 1957;
Pishkin, 1961) a problems variable involved the system­
atic presentation of various dimensions as relevant or 
irrelevant. For instance, one problem may have shape 
relevant and color irrelevant while in a second problem 
the reverse may be true. In all these experiments the 
problems variable was an insignificant source of vari­
ance, This suggests that the basic dimensions such as 
shape, color, size, and number do have somewhat equal 
probabilities of being selected as a relevant dimension. 
This does not support the claims for hierarchical 
response tendencies as being associated with various 
stimulus dimensions (Grant G Curran, 1953; Grant, Jones, 
§ Tallantis, 1949; Heidbreder, 1946; Wohlwill, 1957).
In a study dealing exclusively with the complex­
ity dimension Battig and Bourne (1961) tried to compare
21
the interdimensional variability (complexity variation 
in terms of the ratio of relevant to irrelevant dimenr 
sions) and intradimensional variability (variation 
within the dimension), For example, in the latter case 
a color dimension might have different shades of the 
color representing the dimension. The results very 
clearly demonstrate that both manipulations as main 
effects are highly significant both in terms of total 
errors to criterion and by using trial number on which 
the last error was made. This study demonstrates the 
similar effect of the complexity variation with two 
dependent measures.
Another study by Walker and Bourne (1961) used 
these same two response measures and all possible com­
binations of three levels of relevant and irrelevant 
dimensions. Results of this experiment revealed that 
the most difficult problem is one involving three 
levels of relevant and three levels of irrelevant 
dimensions. A comparison of the two variables revealed 
that the amount of relevant information had the greatest 
effect on performance. It should be noted here that the 
manipulation of relevant dimensions is somewhat differ­
ent from that in previous experiments. Others using 
more than one relevant dimension used the second as a 
redundant dimension (either can be used to solve the
22
problem). This state of affairs leads to facilitation 
of performance. In this study the increase in relevant 
dimensions, increased the difficulty because all were 
needed for solution of the problem.
Another series of investigations has grown out 
of a continuing attempt to relate interactively the 
complexity variable to other variables within the con^ 
cept identification framework. It can be noted that 
previous work reflects an inability to find a variable 
to relate interactively with complexity. In the follow­
ing series, however, a meaningful relationship has been 
found. The variable is called "misinformation feedback" 
(Bourne § Haygood, 1960; Bourne 6 Pendleton, 1958; 
Johannsen, 1962; Morin, 1955; Pishkin, 1960, 1961; 
Wolfgang, Pishkin, 8 Lundy, 1962). Morin gives us a 
definition of the variable:
Misinformation feedback is said to occur when 
an optimum response, one which provides the great­
est expected return over a series of trials, is 
followed by a consequence or signal which informs 
the responder he has made an incorrect response, 
or when a non-optimum response results in a signal 
that the response was correct (1955, p. 343).
Bourne and Pendleton (1958) were among the first to com­
pare complexity and misinformation feedback (MF) in a 
factorial design. Although "completeness of information 
feedback" (one being allowed to respond until correct 
which is complete feedback or to respond only once after
23
a choice was made which was incomplete) was also inves­
tigated, the second experiment used four levels of MF 
(1001, 90%, 80%, and 70%) at three levels of complexity. 
In the misinformation experiment both main effects were 
significant sources of variance. In the first study the 
incomplete feedback condition had a significant inhibi­
tory effect on concept identification. Performance 
level was seen as an inverse function of both the com­
plexity and percentage of misinformation. Among these 
and other findings. Bourne and Pendleton conclude:
Although the analysis of variance indicated no 
significant probability x complexity interaction, 
the data do suggest this is a possibility (1958, 
p. 419).
This suggestion of interaction between complex­
ity and MF was demonstrated by Pishkin (1960), In a 
study using five degrees of MF (0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, and 
40%) and three levels of complexity (1, 3, and 5 irrel­
evant dimensions) main effect significances were ob­
served. In addition to this a differential effect of 
misinformation was observed as the complexity was in­
creased, Misinformation was seen to be the most retard­
ing on the more complex problems.
An extension of Pishkin's (1960) work was per­
formed by Johannsen (1962) in which he assessed the 
effect of MF on concept identification under misinfor­
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mation and 100% correct feedback, i-e., no misinforma­
tion, conditions. The only essential difference in this 
study is that after 200 trials no more misinformation 
was given. The first.part of the experiment confirmed 
Pishkin's (1960) results with both complexity and mis­
information main effects and the interaction term 
significant at the 1% level. An analysis of the sub­
sequent 100% correct feedback condition revealed sig­
nificant differences as a function of complexityi.e., 
the greater the complexity the more errors to criterion.
Two studies that further demonstrate the inters 
active relationship between complexity and misinforma­
tion are Pishkin (1961) and Wolfgang, Pishkin, and Lundy 
(1962) . In the first of these the main purpose was to 
demonstrate the facilitative effect of more regular 
misinformation as opposed to random assignment of the 
same percentage of misinformation. The analysis included 
two levels of complexity (1 and 3 irrelevant dimensions) 
as well as two levels of misinformation feedback (10% 
and 30%). All main effects except problems as well as 
the interaction of misinformation and complexity were 
significant sources of variance. It appears that the 
distribution of misinformation is an important consider­
ation in concept identification tasks; the more regular 
the distribution the better the performance. It was
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also shown that misinformation has the most inhibiting 
effect as the complexity is increased.
In the latter study the design was expanded to 
include three degrees of misinformation (0, 15, and 30%) 
as well as three levels of complexity (Ij 3, and 5 
irrelevant dimensions). All main effects except anxiety 
(forced choice Anxiety Scale, Christie § Budnitzky,
1957) as well as the interaction of misinformation and 
complexity were significant. In both these studies the 
effect of misinformation feedback is most inhibiting as 
the problem becomes more complex.
It can be noted in summary that this review of 
the complexity variable within the concept identifica­
tion framework is not exhaustive. Many others have in­
cluded complexity in their analysis but in every case 
the effect is unambiguous. Indeed, it would appear 
that Underwood's (1949) suggestions on his review of 
the literature in concept learning, . i^.e., (1) that more 
research concentrate on the theoretical aspects of con­
ceptual behavior, and (2) that tasks of various levels 
of complexity be developed and standardized to facili­
tate inter-laboratory communication, has, in some degree 
been realized. Complexity has been defined independent 
of S/s responses as well as described in strict mathe­
matical theoretical terms and has been found to demon-
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strate stable and repeatable effects on the rate of con­
cept identification.
Memory and Concept Identification.--Hunt (1962), 
after an introduction to behavior theory, concept forma­
tion, and classical learning (Chapter I, II, and III) 
goes on (Chapter IV) to describe methods and experiments 
that reflect attempts to define the stimulus complex in 
an objective and, quantitative manner. The first attempt 
to consider concept learning in terms of a human ability 
is in Chapter V, "Memory and Concept Learning." In 
spite of the so-called "no memory models" (Restle, 1961; 
Trabasso § Bower^1964) and strategies which suggest 
minimal use of memory (Bruner, ejt al. ; 1956) the more 
general consensus is that memory in terms of information 
storage is an important ingredient in problem solving 
behavior. As Hunt states:
The studies by Bruner and his associates, al­
though among the important in the field, cannot be 
taken as proof that humans normally use strategies 
which eliminate memory requirements in concept 
learning. It is certainly true that strategies 
exist which can eliminate most memory requirements 
(1962, p. 143).
Dominowski (1965), in his review of the role of 
memory requirements in concept learning, also concludes 
that there are many demonstrations bearing on the impor­
tance of memory in concept learning. He does, however, 
point out the many problems presented by the extreme
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heterogeneity of problems and techniques used. He 
further suggests that these various procedures, might 
well create different memory requirements. And, as 
Hunt suggests, these same differing requirements can 
only be interpreted in the light of individual differ­
ences in strategy selection. He concludes:
There can be little doubt that concept learning 
is affected by memory. How and how much will be 
determined by the strategy ,pf .inductive reasoning 
used by the learner (1962/ p.‘ rS6).
The limitations of the "human computer" in terms 
of information storage is evidenced by the finding of a 
facilitative effect of positive as opposed to negative 
instances (hypotheses as to what the concept is rather 
than to what it is not) in concept attainment (Bourne, 
Goldstein, § Link, 1964; Braley, 1963; Donaldson, 1959; 
Hovland § Weiss, 1953; Olson, 1963; Pishkin § Wolfgang, 
1965; Smoke, 1932, 1933).
The relevance of the investigation into the 
preferences for positive and negative instances concerns 
the limitations of the "human computer" in terms of 
information storage. The use of positive instances puts 
a lighter load on memory storage. The extreme in this 
direction is the "no memory" models (Restle, 1961) where 
sampling is with replacement. In this instance only 
positive instances are used in the identification of the 
concept :
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The use of exclusion (negative instances) solu­
tions then is a distinctly secondary or "higher 
level" problem solving strategy, and because of the 
load it puts on memory processes it is likely to have 
a low probability of evocation (Braley, 1963, p. 159),
This investigation of positive and negative in­
stances in concept formation can be traced back to Smoke 
(1932, 1933) where he first demonstrated the preference 
of positive instances in the identification of concepts. 
Hovland (1952) reconsidered Smoke's data and suggested 
that the question could not be so conclusively decided 
on the basis of his technique. The criticism concerned 
the instructional definition of the positive and negative 
conditions. As the problem was constructed it could be 
defined by either positive or negative or both types of 
instances. In an attempt to provide a more conclusive 
answer to this question, Hovland and Weiss (1953) repli­
cated Smoke's study, using visual stimuli which were 
equated for information content and, in one part, for 
number of instances. The results in general supported 
Smoke's conclusions with the qualification that concepts 
can be learned by negative instances, >• there is
information to be used even if most find it easier to 
use the positive instances. As Hovland and Weiss state:
The all-negative instances are thus shown to be 
consistently inferior to all-positive. At the same 
time, the results disprove the generalization that 
concepts cannot be learned from negative instances 
(1953, p. 182).
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More direct information concerning the role of 
memory and concept formation is given by Cahill and 
Hovland (1960). Using the same "closed" system procedure 
(Ss are aware of the universe of dimensions in the situa­
tion) as Hovland and Weiss, they attempted to simulate 
an "unlimited memory" condition. The unlimited memory 
condition consisted of making available to the S all 
previous instances of the concept as he proceeded toward 
solution. The "limited memory" condition was the very 
opposite, i.e., all previous instances were removed from 
the S's view. The results show conclusively on problems 
of two levels of difficulty that the "unlimited memory" 
condition facilitated concept identification. An analy­
sis of hypotheses that were incompatible with previous 
instances also revealed that errors of "incompatibility" 
rose as the number of instances increased. This did not 
occur in the condition where all previous instances re­
mained in view. Hunt (1961) replicated this work using 
both positive and negative instances.
Bourne, Goldstein, and Link (1964) followed up 
the effect of availability of previously presented infor­
mation (Cahill § Hovland, 1960), also using both positive 
and negative instances, and found support for this prev­
ious work, i_.£., the more available previous instances 
of the concept the fewer the errors of identification.
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It was also shown that the facilitative effect of avail­
ability was greatest in the more complex task. This 
also confirmed the results of Cahill and Hovland. An 
analysis of positive and negative instances indicated 
that significantly more presentations of the negative 
instances were necessary for solution as compared with 
positive instances for each level of availability.
Pishkin and Wolfgang (1965) extended this prob­
lem in an attempt to find out what kinds of available 
information are most useful. Hovland and Weiss (1953) 
and Cahill and Hovland (1960) used only negative in­
stances while Hunt (1961) and Bourne, Goldstein, and 
Link (1964) used both positive and negative instances. 
Pishkin and Wolfgang (1965) therefore investigated each 
of these three instances as conditions (positive, nega­
tive, and combined) as well as a degree of availability 
(number of available instances 0, 1, 2, 3, 4). The 
results confirm the generalization that the availability 
of instances does facilitate concept identification and 
that the availability of positive instances is a most 
important variable. The presence of the positive inr 
stances was found to be more important than the number 
of previous instances made available.
A final study by Bourne, Guy, Dodd and Justesen 
(1965) dealing with variation of intertrial intervals
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(1, 15, 29 secs.) and the availability of either or both 
the stimulus pattern and reinforcement signal also showed 
a facilitative effect due to the availability of the 
stimulus instance. This difference also was most marked 
at the longer (29 secs.) intertrial interval.
In summary of this work it seems very clear that 
memory plays an important part of the identification of 
concepts. There seems little support for the "no memory" 
model (Restle, 1961). As Pishkin and Wolfgang point out:
Facilitative effects of availability of "memory" 
formation from past trials lend no support for the 
"no memory" assumption in concept learning (1965,
p. 8).
Two facts, then,-seem to emerge here. First, 
the longer the intertrial interval the greater the load 
on the memory capacity (Archer, 1953). The second gen­
eralization concerns the complexity of the concept task; 
the greater the complexity the greater the memory load. 
These generalizations are drawn from the findings of 
greater facilitation due to available instances in these 
conditions, i.e., longer intertrial intervals and on the 
more complex problems.
The preference for the use of positive instances 
in the identification of concepts also suggests that the 
S stores best the dimension upon which he received rein­
forcement. This is consistent with the operant, S-R 
paradigm which stresses the facilitative effect of
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immediate reinforcement on learning [Holland, 1960; 
Skinner, 1958).
If this statement has any validity then it would 
seem important to investigate the effect of immediate as 
opposed to a delay of reinforcement in the identifica­
tion of concepts. If immediate reinforcement is associ­
ated with the better storage of stimulus dimensions then 
a delay of this same reinforcement should result in a 
diminution in storing which should, in turn, be reflected 
in poorer performance in the identification of concepts. 
This notion has been interpreted by Dominowski [1965) as 
a form of response contiguity, a term postulated by 
Underwood [1952) to be an essential ingredient in concept 
learning. In concept identification terms it is called 
"delay of information feedback." The facilitative effect 
in the Bourne and Restle model rests on the "stimulus 
trace argument" of Estes (1955) which assumes that the 
number of elements in the sample of stimulus elements 
chosen decays exponentially with the time since the 
stimulus has been presented. Within this framework 
Bourne (1957) proposed that an increase in the temporal 
separation between presentation of the stimulus and in­
dication of the correct response to that stimulus should 
interfere with concept identification because the stimu­
lus and the correct response occur less contiguously and.
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as Bourne states:
The greater the delay interval the more S must 
rely on memory to maintain the stimulus across the 
time gap (1957, p. 20,1).
Bourne’s study was a 6 x 3 factorial design using three
levels of complexity (1, 3, and 5 irrelevant dimensions)
and six levels of feedback delay (.0 to 8.0 secs.). As
predicted by main effect variables were significant; but
the hypothesized interaction of these variables was not.
Another interval that has been observed to b e . 
important in terms of concept learning is the post-feed- 
back interval or intertrial interval. This interval 
involves the amount of time between the reinforcement 
of any response and the appearance of the next stimulus 
instance. In fact, Bourne and Bunderson (1963) looked 
at Bourne’s (1957) study more closely and found that 
these two intervals were confounded in his study. When 
Bourne increased in delay of reinforcement interval he 
did not adjust the post feedback interval accordingly. 
This resulted in a situation where a long delay of rein­
forcement resulted in a short post feedback interval.
In view of this situation Bourne and Bunderson (1963) 
replicated the study taking into account the previous 
limitation. They expanded the design so that both the 
delay of reinforcement interval and the post feedback 
interval were varied. Two degrees of task complexity
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were also included. The results of this study revealed 
that the post feedback interval to be the most important. 
Delay of reinforcement was quite insignificant. The 
main effect of complexity was significant as well as the . 
interaction between the post feedback interval and com­
plexity. The observed effect of variation in post feed­
back interval was greater in problems with five than in 
problems with one irrelevant dimension.
In summary, it would appear that the delayed 
feedback interval is not a significant variable when the 
delay is unfilled. Other studies have also reported the 
ineffectiveness of this interval (Bilodeau § Bilodeau, 
1958; Bilodeau 8 Ryan, 1960; Denny, Allard, Hall, § 
Rokeach, 1960; Noble § Alcock, 1958). However, the post 
feedback was found to account for a significant proper^ 
tion of the variation. The implication, of course, is 
that the intertrial interval is probably the more appro­




In a recent essay on the psychological study of 
conceptual thinking, Hearnshaw pointed to the many prob­
lems in this area that need attention:
What is the place of the capacity to conceptual­
ize in the structure of human abilities? Is it the 
same thing as, or an aspect of, the general factor 
of intelligence? Is it linked in any way to the 
verbal factor and linguistic ability? Or to the 
spatial factor and the ability to appreciate pat­
terns? . . .  Is it related somehow to some memory 
factor? (1954, p.5.)
The basic problem underlying the present invest­
igation concerns the lack of understanding of the 
processes by which one identifies concepts. To para­
phrase Hearnshaw, what is the place of the capacity to 
identify concepts in the structure of human abilities? 
The attempt to answer this question has led to the in­
vestigation of three general areas. First, the invest­
igation of higher thought processes (conceptual behav­
ior) has always been important in the study of psycho- 
pathologic groups. Goldstein's (1939, 1944, 1959, 1963) 
work could be mentioned to illustrate this point. And, 
not only did Goldstein point out this deficit, he also
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made an attempt to conceptualize his observations. Con­
cepts like "abstract-concrete" and "catastrophic anxiety" 
are part of this attempt to explain the processes in­
volved in the formation of abstract concepts.
A second area of investigation concerns another 
clinical observation reported by those working with 
psychopathologic groups: that of a memory deficit.
This observation has a long history and is an established 
clinical symptom. Wechsler (1945) emphasized this area 
of cognitive activity in the diagnosis in psychopathol­
ogy. The development of the Wechsler Memory Scale 
(Wechsler, 1945) illustrated this emphasis and is used 
to this day.
It should be noted here that memory deficits do 
not occur equally to all events stored. As Russell and 
Nathan point out:
Memory for events is not a static process. If 
it were, then distant memories would surely fade 
gradually and would be the more vulnerable to the 
effects of injury. On the contrary, when the brain 
is injured, these distant memories are the least 
vulnerable. . . . The normal activity of the brain 
must steadily strengthen distant memories so that 
with thé passage of time these become less vulner­
able to the effects of head injury.
General brain trauma therefore has an effect on 
recent niemory which is much greater than its effect 
on remote memory. . . . (1946, pp. 298-299.)
The question can pose in the light of these two 
areas of investigation is: are the deficits observed in
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concept identification somehow connected to the observed 
memory deficits? In other words, what is the role of 
the human capacity to process and store information in 
the identification of abstract concepts? The attempt to 
answer this question brings one to the third general 
area of investigation: the investigation of the contri­
bution of memory and concept identification in normal 
subjects using standardized and quantifiable techniques. 
The traditional techniques have been characterized as 
too global and qualitative to help in delineating the 
role of this memory function in the identification of 
concepts.
This area of investigation can be described as 
a combination of information theory principles and 
mathematical model techniques. The specific model 
which antecedes this experiment is that of Bourne and 
Restle (1959). And among the great number of experiments 
stimulated by this model there are many that have dealt 
with this problem of memory and concept identification 
(Bourne, Goldstein, § Link, 1964; Bourne, Guy, Dodd, G 
Justesen, 1965; Cahill G Hovland, 1960; Hunt, 1961; 
Pishkin G Wolfgang, 1965; Pishkin, Wolfgang, G Rasmussen, 
1967).
The main variable and one of the most reliable 
features of the concept identification (Cl) work is the
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systematic manipulation of the difficulty level. This 
is a problem that has always plagued the concept forma­
tion and problem solving area. The Cl model has accom­
plished a systematic variation of problem complexity 
that can be defined independent of the subject's behav­
ior. This complexity variable is also felt to be related 
to memory requirements. In other words, the more complex 
the task, the greater the memory requirements.
A second variable that has been traditionally 
used in memory work is the manipulation of time between 
events that depend on each other for the solution of the 
problem. The greater this time interval the greater the 
memory requirements.
In a recent study (Baumeister, Smith, § Rose, 
1965), using retarded and normal adults, the variables 
of intelligence, stimulus complexity, and intertrial 
intervals were investigated. The task appeared to be 
modelled after that of Hull (1920) because Chinese char­
acters were used in a "common element" paradign of 
concept identification. A 2 x 4 x 3 analysis of vari­
ance design indicating the group, complexity, and 
interval variables was used. The intertrial intervals 
were 2, 12, and 20 seconds.
The results indicated that all main effect and 
first order interactions were significant sources of
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variance. The normals were first seen to give a signifi­
cantly greater number of correct identifications across 
all levels of complexity and intertrial intervals. A 
significant decrement in correct identifications was also 
seen as a function of an increase in complexity, i..£., 
both groups made more errors as the complexity of the 
problem increased, and the significant interaction of 
these two variables revealed that differences in per­
formance between normals and retardates became greater 
as the complexity increased, the retardates, of course, 
showing a steeper drop in correct responses as the com­
plexity increased. The analysis of the intertrial inter­
val also revealed significant differences between inter­
vals as well as a significant interaction with groups; 
the longer the delay interval the greater the inhibiting 
effect on the retardates. These results were interpreted 
within the "stimulus trace hypothesis" (Ellis, 1963) 
where differences in performance were predicted on the 
basis of a short term memory loss in the mentally re­
tarded. It is also obvious from this study that the 
more complex the task, the greater the load on memory.
The significance and effect of the intertrial 
interval on concept identification within the Bourne and 
Restle model has already been discussed (Bourne § Bunder­
son, 1963; Bourne, Guy, Dodd, § Justesen, 1965), In the
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latter study the main effect variables of complexity and 
intertrial interval were significant. Furthermore, the 
interaction of these variables was also significant. 
Greater errors occurred in the more complex problems as 
the intertrial increased beyond 17 seconds.
The present experiment used these variables 
[complexity and intertrial interval) plus a groups vari­
able involving the use of brain injured patients. The 
following main hypotheses were tested:
(1) A -significantly greater number of errors 
will be observed in the brain injured than in the control 
group,
(2) The more complex tasks are expected to result 
in a greater number of errors in both groups.
(3) A differential effect of complexity on the 
groups was also expected. The more complex tasks will 
lead to a relatively greater number of errors in the 
brain damaged group.
(4) The introduction of intertrial intervals 
will result in significant differences in the identifi­
cation of concepts. The greater intervals will lead to 
poorer performance,
(5) This variable was also expected to exert a 
differential effect on Ss groups. The brain damage
Ss will be expected to perform significantly poorer
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as the intertrial interval increases as compared to 
controls.
(6) Due to the hypothesized added memory load 
in more complex tasks, an interaction between complexity 
and intertrial intervals is also expected; performance 





The subjects for the present investigation 
were patients from the Veterans Administration Hospital, 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The experimental group of 45 
brain damaged was selected against a strict neurological 
criterion (Appendix I) and later rated by a staff neur­
ologist as to the degree and locus of CNS involvement. 
The control group of 45 hospitalized patients was also 
selected against a strict medical criterion intended to 
exclude evidence of CNS involvement (Appendix II).
These patients were also rated to confirm the initial 
selection. The control group consisted almost entirely 
of patients from the orthopedic ward of the hospital. 
Only five patients were included from other medical 
wards and were included because of obvious peripheral 
difficulties such as skin rash or hernia. Descriptive 
data on control patients appears in Appendix IV.
The subscale used for final group selection 
appeared on a five point scale (Appendix II). Table I 
illustrates this scale and gives the total subject
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pool from which the experimental and control groups were 
determined.
TABLE I 
NUMBER OF Ss BY RATINGS
Brain Damage Control Brain Damage Scale
45 0 1. Definitely
4 0 2. Strongly suspected
3 2 3. Suspected
1 9 4. Not likely
0 45 5. Definitely not
In the final brain damaged group the major neur­
ological diagnostic classifications were as follows:
TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE DATA ON THE BRAIN DAMAGED GROUP
Number of Ss Diagnostic Category
9 1. Tumor
15 2. Cerebral Vascular Accident (CVA)
13 3. Trauma
2 4. Inflammatory or Infectious Disease
3 5. Degenerative or Demyelinating
3 6. Atypical
Additional descriptive data on the brain damage group 
appears in Appendix III.
The mean age for the brain damage group was
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45.91 years and for the control group, 45.55 years. A 
t^test computed on these data indicated this was not a 
significant difference. The mean educational level of 
the brain damage was 10,22 years, the controls, 9.80 
years. Again the difference was tested by a t-test, 
which revealed these as not significantly different.
It can also be stated that the individual cell means 
on these variables were also found to be insignificantly 
different (Appendix IV).
Design
The experimental design consisted of a 2 x 3 x 3 
factorial: two groups, brain damaged and control; three
levels of complexity, 1, 3, and 5 irrelevant dimensions; 
and three intertrial interval periods, 1, 15, and 29 
seconds. Each ^ performed individually and the depend­
ent variables relevant to the factorial design were 
errors and decision time. The design was replicated 
five times.
Apparatus and Task 
The stimulus instances of the concept were back- 
projected onto an 8 X 10 inch opaque screen by a Dunning 
Animatic 16 mm. strip-film projector. The screen was 
mounted on a 4 x 4 x 8 foot panel which was painted flat 
black. This screen was situated at eye-level on the
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panel. Just below this screen panel was a response 
panel upon which were situated two response keys and, 
above each of these, two small amber lights. The S's 
task was to solve a two-choice discrimination problem 
by successively selecting one or the other of two keys 
in response to invariant pattern dimensions, £•£» > 
depression of the left key for the image of a triangle, 
of the right key for a square, etc. The keys were not 
marked in any way. The apparatus was the same as used 
by Pishkin (1960).
Procedure
The S was instructed as to the nature of the 
task, the meaning of the feedback lamps (which indicates 
whether the response was right or wrong), and manipula­
tion of the controls:
On the screen in front of you, you will see a 
series of geometric patterns. Each pattern is a 
part of a problem which can be discovered by press­
ing one of two buttons you find on the panel below 
the screen. When you have chosen the correct button 
the light just above the button will light up. When 
you have chosen the wrong button the light above the 
other button will light up. Your task is to dis­
cover the rule which will light the light above the 
button each time. If you are not sure, guess; your 
guesses or hunches may turn out to be right, and it 
is important that you be right as often as possible. 
The patterns will change in various ways but the 
rule will remain the same throughout all the_pat- 
terns. Any questions before we begin?
In most cases these instructions were sufficient 
to inform the S of the task at hand. When there was a
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question the E emphasized by an example how the S could 
tell if he got a right or wrong response. No information 
concerning the stimulus characteristics was given.
The task was begun by the S viewing a geometric 
pattern projected on a screen directly in front of him 
and at eye level. After a self-determined interval (the 
S could view the pattern as long as he wished before 
responding), S responded by pressing one of the two keys. 
The depressed key initiated a signal which recorded S's 
choice on a chart of an Esterline-Angus operations re­
corder and triggered a cascaded multiple-phase electronic 
timer. Phase 1 of the timer advanced the film strip to 
a blank frame. Phase 2 activated a Western Union tape 
transmitter which was punched to match the filmstrip 
programming. This enabled the response (either correct 
or incorrect) to be registered on the Esterline-Angus 
operations recorder. In addition, the same information 
coded on the tape led to the illumination of one of the 
two panel lights situated just above each of the S_'s 
response keys. The lamp remained illuminated for 1 
second. Phase 3 advanced the filmstrip to the next 
stimulus to begin another trial after either a 1 second, 
a 15 second, or a 29 second interval from the Ŝ 's last 
response.
Three strip-filmed series of patterns were used;
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each having one relevant dimension and either 1, 3, or 5 
irrelevant dimensions. A dimension was found to be rele­
vant when its use by the S led to successive positive 
identifications indicated by the illumination of the 
lamp just above the key chosen. A negative identifica­
tion is indicated by the illumination of the lamp above 
the other key. All irrelevant dimensions had a zero 
correlation with correct responses. When a particular 
dimension was neither relevant nor irrelevant, it ap­
peared without variation at only one of its two levels 
within a given series.
Following this initial experimental procedure 
each S was given a series of psychometric tests.
Psychological Measures
Wechsler Memory Scale (Form I) (Wechsler, 1945).-■ 
The assumption underlying the analysis of concept identi­
fication in terms of memory requirements was that all 
brain damaged patients to some greater or lesser degree 
will demonstrate an impaired memory. In order to provide 
an independent check on this assumption it was decided to 
include a traditional clinical measurement of memory 
functions.
Vocabulary and Block Design Subtests of the
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Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 1958) . -- 
Concept tasks have frequently been found to bear a cor­
relative relationship to intelligence. This finding has 
not, however, always been found in relation to the con­
cept identification task (Lydecker, Pishkin, 8 Martin, 
1961; Wolfgang, Pishkin, § Lundy, 1962). In both of 
these studies a different population as well as a dif­
ferent measure of intelligence was used.
Gorham Proverbs Test (Best Answer Form) [Gorham, 
1956).--Several studies in the concept identification 
area have used an abstraction score as a measure of in­
tellectual functioning (Lydecker, Pishkin, 8 Martin, 
1961; Pishkin § Blanchard, 1963; Wolfgang, et al., (in 
press); Wolfgang, Pishkin, § Lundy, 1962). Again it was 
felt that the inclusion of a traditional measure of ab­
stract thinking would be appropriate. This instrument 
has been used in the study of brain damaged populations 
and has been shown to reflect different conceptual 
levels. A theoretical base for this test is within 
Goldstein's (1939) characterization of the consequences 
of brain damage.
Motivational Rating Scale (Hoepfner, Guilford,
§ Merrifield, 1964).--This scale included questions de­
signed to reflect gross motivational level. The first
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item was a request to rate how much you like the tests 
you have taken. The scaled items were: (1) very much,
(2) pretty much, (3) a little, (4) not very much, and 
(5) not at all. The second item was rate how hard you 
have worked on the tests you have taken. These items 
were: (1) as hard as I cquld, (2) very hard, (3) fairly
hard, (4) not very hard, and (5) not hard at all.
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate 
the role of memory in the identification of concepts.
The technique used was to (1) select a group that is 
known to exhibit symptoms of memory loss and (2) use an 
experimental task that could be ordered in terms of mem­
ory requirements.
The analysis of variance of error scores is 
given in Table 2.
Figure 1 illustrates this linear component as 
well as the groups main effect. This figure also illus­
trates the failure of the hypothesized G X C interaction. 
The only other factor that approached significance in 
this analysis was the G X I interaction term (Table 2).
It can be seen here that the effect of intertrial inter­
val is evident in the control group but without effect 
in the brain damaged. The effect in the control group 
was such that a Duncan's Test was used to test the 
decline in errors at the longer intertrial interval 
conditions. This revealed a significant drop in errors 























Fig. l.--Mean error scores for brain damaged and 













Fig. 2.--Mean error scores for brain damaged and 
control groups at different intertrial intervals.
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The analysis of variance of decision time scores 
is presented in Table 3. This dependent measure was a 
result of the self-paced aspect of the experimental pro­
cedure and represents the mean amount of time taken to 
decide which of the two buttons to push.
TABLE 3
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: ERRORS
Variance Source ss ms f E
Groups (G) 1 4466.18 4466.18 7.05 .01
Complexity (C) 2 13259.46 6629.73 10.48 .001
Linear 1 13201.66 13201.66 20.86 .001
Quadratic 1 57.80 57.80
Intertrial In­
terval Cl) 2 1069.26 534.63
G X C 2 113.97 56.98
G X I 2 1745.37 872.68 1.38
C X I 4 715.70 178.70
G X C X I 4 1036.18 258.04
Error 72 45564.80 632.80
Total 89 67970.92
As can be seen in Table 3 the groups and inter­
trial main effects were the only factors significant in 
the analysis. The significant groups effect illustrates 
the tendency for the brain damaged S to take longer to 
decide which button to push. This groups effect is 
illustrated in Figure 3. It can also be noted here that 
in the brain damaged group there is a tendency for the 
decision time scores to become greater as the difficulty
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The analysis of variance of decision time scores 
is presented in Table 3. This dependent measure was a 
result of the self-paced aspect of the experimental pro­
cedure and represents the mean amount of time taken to 
decide which of the two buttons to push.
TABLE 3
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: ERRORS
Variance Source M ss ms f E
Groups (G) 1 4466.18 4466.18 7.05 01
Complexity (C) 2 13259.46 6629.73 10.48 001
Linear 1 13201.66 13201.66 20.86 001
Quadratic 1 57.80 57.80
Intertrial In­
terval (I) 2 1069.26 534.63
A X E 2 113.97 56.98
A X C 2 1745.37 872.68 1.38
B X C 4 715.70 178.70
A X B X C 4 1036.18 258.04
Error 72 45564.80 632.80
Total 89 67970.92
As can be seen in Table 3 the groups and inter
trial main effects were the only factors significant in 
the analysis. The significant groups effect illustrates 
the tendency for the brain damaged S to take longer to 
decide which button to push. This groups effect is 
illustrated in Figure 3. It can also be noted here that 
in the brain damaged group there is a tendency for the 
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Fig. 3.--Mean decision time for brain damage and 
control groups at different levels of complexity.
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of the problem increases. A Duncan's was used to test 
this tendency and there is a significant rise in reaction 
time on the 3 as opposed to the 1 complexity level (42 df, 
£ < .05) .
The significant intertrial interval main effect 
represents the tendency for Ss to take longer to decide 
as the intertrial interval increases. An orthogonal 
polynomial analysis was also employed on the intertrial 
factor and revealed a significant linear effect (Table 
3). It can be seen from Figure 4 that the greater group 
contribution to this effect comes from the brain damaged.
The next results to be presented concern the 
analysis of the various psychometric measures that were
TABLE 4
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: DECISION TIME
Variance Score M ss ms f E
Group (G) 1 628451.70 628451.70 7.42 .01
Complexity (C) 
Intertrial In­
2 282571.00 141235.50 1.67
terval (I) 2 672308.63 336104.31 3.97 .05
Linear 1 510788.27 510788.27 6.03 .05
Quadratic 1 161520.36 161520.36 1.91
G X C 2 190039.95 95019.97 1.12
G X I 2 173393.12 86696.56 1.02
C X I  



































Fig. 4.--Mean decision time for brain damage and 
control groups at^different intertrial intervals.
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administered each patient. The group differences between 
these measures are presented in Table S.
In addition to these group differences several 
correlations were computed to relate the psychometric 
tests with the concept identification task. These re­
sults appear in Table 6.
TABLE 5
GROUP DIFFERENCES ON PSYCHOMETRIC TESTS
Psychometric Test Brain Control t £Damage
1. Wechsler Memory Scale 79.14 94.18 4.40 .001
2. Vocabulary.Scale 7.66 8.87 1.80 .10
3. Block Design Subtest 7.34 10.24 4.68 .001
4. Full Scale Estimate 15.00 19.10 3.94 .001
5. Abstract Score 16.20 20.30 2.32 .03
6. Motivation 3.09 3.40 1.03 N.S.
TABLE 6
CORRELATIONS OF PSYCHOMETRIC MEASURES
WITH CONCEPT IDENTIFICATION
Measure Brain Damage Control Overall
L  £ L  £ r £
Age . 04 ns -.09 ns - ,05 ns
Education . 00 ns -.21 ns -.09 ns
Memory Scale .38 <.005 -.20 ns -.38 < .0005
Vocabulary Subtest . 23 ns -.22 ns - . 26 < .01
Block Design Subtest .31 .025 -.10 ns - .30 < .005
Full Scale Estimate .33 .025 -.20 ns -.33 < .005
Abstract Score .20 ns -.25 <.05 -.28 < .005
Decision Time . 06 ns -.10 ns .12 ns
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION
Since the analysis of variance of errors was the 
first consideration it will be handled first. The orig­
inal hypotheses will be stated and discussed in order.
1. A significantly greater number of errors will 
be observed in the brain damaged as opposed to the 
control group.
This hypothesis was supported and as such con­
firms a wealth of clinical and experimental evidence 
that indicates that patients with lesions of the brain 
do not perform as well on tasks requiring conceptualiza­
tion as patients who do not. The importance of this 
finding lies in the fact that the deficit is demons 
strated on a task that is characterized by very standard­
ized procedures and rigorous stimulus definition. This 
allows a certain amount of control over conditions which 
will be necessary if the uncovering of the complex pro­
cesses involved in conceptual thought is to be accom­
plished.
The importance of these differences should also 
be viewed in the light of the experimental control vari­
ables such as age, education, motivation, and, as it
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turned out, vocabulary level. Many investigators have 
stressed not only the importance of controlling for age, 
sex, education, socio-economic class, and intelligence 
(Hebb, 1945; Meyer, 1961; Reitan, 1962; Smith, 1962) but 
also have emphasized the distortion that can occur from 
lack of or misuse of control data. The care that was 
taken to insure control on these variables makes the 
effect observed even more unequivocal. Indeed, there 
would seem to be little room for doubt that the presence 
of a cerebral lesion in humans does have quantifiable 
effects and that these effects are shown to be related 
to higher conceptual activity. It is also important 
to note that these groups also differed in terms of 
measures that were obtained clinically. They demon­
strated large differences on the Wechsler Memory Scale 
as well as the Block Design subtest of the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale (WALS). Both of these are 
standard instruments used to evaluate conceptual and 
intellectual functions. With this in mind, it is inter­
esting to look at the lack of group differences on the 
Vocabulary measure, a finding somewhat unusual with 
studies using brain damage. This, of course, is because 
aphasies are often used as well as a lack of adequate 
control of age and education. All the brain damaged in 
this study, while not in every case entirely free of
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aphasie symptoms, could communicate with the examiner in 
free conversation. It is interesting to note the large 
differences in Block Design scores and concept identifi­
cation scores in the face of an insignificant difference 
in vocabulary level. If we look at these two tasks we 
see they both entail the "spatial" dimensions of color, 
shape, number, etc. Now in the traditional brain- 
behavior framework this lack of proficiency with "spa­
tial" tasks is characteristically associated with right 
hemisphere damage. It would be significant, in terms of 
the present investigation, if the deficit shown on the 
concept identification task could be shown to be coming 
mainly from those patients with right hemisphere lesions.
To find the answer to this question of laterality 
of lesion and Cl performance the rating data were em­
ployed. Using these data the brain damaged Ss were 
divided into left and right sided groups (Appendix III). 
Of the 45 brain damaged patients, only 36 (20 left sided 
and 16 right sided) could be used for this purpose. The 
remaining Ss had injury that was bilateral in nature.
An investigation of concept identification performance 
showed no difference between the left and right sided 
groups (X^ = 46.95; X^ = -7.87; t = <1). It should be 
noted that whenever a within group breakdown is related 
to error scores the relative number of 1, 3, and 5
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complexity levels is seen to be equal or at least not 
significantly different. In this instance there was an 
equal number of solutions in the right sided and the left 
sided groups.
The finding of a visual conceptual task being 
equally sensitive to both right and left hemisphere im­
pairment is not unique, Doehring and Reitan, using the 
Categories Test, found no differential performance be­
tween similar left and right sided lesion groups. In 
explanation of this finding, they conclude that
Concept attainment on the Category Test may involve 
a fundamental kind of reasoning ability that is 
impaired to a certain extent by any cortical lesion; 
or concept attainment on the Category Test may 
require the combined application of a number of 
primary abilities, both verbal and non-verbal (1962, 
p. 32).
They also mention similar results by Shure and Halstead 
(1958) and Chapman and Wolff (1959).
The extent to which a similar interpretation can 
be given the present results may indicate the extent to 
which the two tasks used are similar. Some of the more 
obvious similarities are: (1) an automatic feedback
system involving the mechanical manipulation of a button 
or key, (2) basic conceptual dimensions such as color, 
shape, number, etc., and (3) they are both self-paced 
tasks.
In summary, it would appear that performance on
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the concept identification task is not hemisphere- 
specific, , the abilities tapped cannot be character­
ized in the usual verbal-performance type dichotomy.
This has important implications for the study of concept­
ual processes as a unitary non-specific ability. It 
points up the necessity of choosing measuring instruments 
for conceptual activity very carefully. As Heibrun has 
stated: ’’The theoretical psychologist is faced with the
problem of divorcing his brain-behavior hypotheses from 
the characteristics of his measurement techniques (1962, 
p. 514). This problem would not seem to be as acute 
using the concept identification task.
2. The more complex tasks are expected to result 
in a greater number of errors by both groups.
This hypothesis is tested by the complexity 
effect and is one of the most striking differences ob­
served in this investigation. Figure 1 illustrates this 
finding with its linear component. This finding is most 
significant in that it confirms the quite extensive num­
ber of investigations that have consistently established 
the linear character of the complexity variable. This 
investigation also confirms this relationship on a popu­
lation that is different from those used in some of the 
other studies using the complexity variable. The present 
study, of course, used a patient population which was 
characterized by a somewhat low socio-economic status.
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middle age, (45 years), and relatively low education (10 
years schooling). In addition, one half of these pa­
tients demonstrated positive signs of central nervous 
system damage. Other studies finding significant main 
effects of complexity have used college students (Archer, 
Bourne, § Brown, 1955; Bourne, 1957; Pishkin, 1960), male 
and female psychiatric aides (Wolfgang, Pishkin, § Lundy, 
1962), male psychiatric nursing assistants (Pishkin, 
1961), and schizophrenics (Lydecker, Pishkin, 6 Martin, 
1961; Pishkin, 1963; Pishkin 6 Wolfgang, 1964; Pishkin, 
Wolfgang, G Bradshaw, 1963). It can be seen here that 
with the addition of the present population the generali- 
zability of this variable is even greater. There would 
seem to be little doubt that the concept identification 
model does provide well defined complexity levels that 
lead to differential responses.
3. A differential effect of complexity on the 
groups was also expected. The more complex tasks 
will lead to a relatively greater number of errors 
in the brain damaged group.
This hypothesis was tested by the group x com­
plexity interaction and was found to be insignificant.
The assumption underlying the hypothesis is an interpre­
tation of the complexity variable in terms of memory rer 
quirements. In the face its failure, this assumption 
would not appear valid. How, then, is one to interpret 
the poorer yet parallel performance of the brain
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damaged group?
One attempt to discover an answer to this ques­
tion was to break up the brain damaged group into the 
previously mentioned lateralized groups. It was felt 
that this breakdown would indicate either some support 
for the original assumption or suggest an alternative.
It did not. The performance of these two lateralized 
groups did not differ significantly.
If, indeed, the more complex tasks place an 
added load on memory functions, it is not apparent here. 
At first one might question whether or not the brain 
damaged do differ in terms of memory abilities. This, 
however, must be rejected to the extent to which one 
can agree that the Wechsler Memory Scale measures memory 
capacity. How, then, can these parallel effects become 
meaningful?
One possibility of interpretation was suggested 
by a combination of events. These are: (1) significant
differences on the block design, a traditional perceptual 
task, (2) the concept identification performance being 
non-specific to the lateralization of the lesion, (3) 
the previous finding of similar parallel performance of 
brain damage and controls on a perceptual task (Parsons, 
Majumder, § Chandler, 1966),
These points, and especially the thinking
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involved in the third, suggests that a hypothesized non­
specific perceptual deficit may account for the fact of 
different but parallel performance. The basic thinking 
involved in the use of this interpretation centers around 
the idea that there may be a flaw in the initial process­
ing of information rather than a deficit in recalling 
information. And the same disturbed neural processes 
that would explain the memory disturbance can also be 
postulated to underlie the perceptual deficit. Hebb 
(1949), in his classic treatment of learning and percept­
ual processes, established a strong argument for 
perceptual generalization in terms of neural processes. 
Disturbed perceptual processes for Hebb involve a dis­
turbance in the "phase sequences" that underlie the 
recording of the perceptual information. Other authors 
have used similar types of concepts such as a "filter" 
between cortical levels (Gaddum, 1966) or "gating" cen­
tral mechanisms (Cheatham § White, 1952). At the psycho­
logical level the effects of this mal-adaptive filtering 
process could be termed "instability of attention" (Hebb, 
1949) or "reduced psychological vigilance" (Shure § Hal­
stead, 1958) .
In summary, it has been suggested here that the 
parallel effects manifested by the brain damaged group 
are better explained as a defect in the "information
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processing” or "filter" mechanisms that are involved in 
visual learning tasks rather than in terms of.a memory 
deficit. The argument has been developed that this per­
ceptual deficit is equally evident in the three complex­
ity levels even though at the lower levels of complexity 
the deficit does not, in some instances, impair solution 
of the problem.
4. The introduction of intertrial intervals will 
result in significant differences in the identifica­
tion of concepts. The greater intervals will lead 
to poorer performance.
5. This variable was also expected to exert a 
differential effect on Ss groups. The brain damage 
subjects will be expected to perform poorer as the 
intertrial interval increases.
6. Due to the hypothesized added memory load in 
more complex tasks, the interaction between complex­
ity and intertrial interval is also expected; per­
formance being poorest at the higher complexity and 
longest intertrial interval.
These hypotheses were tested and the groups by 
intertrial interval interaction as well as by the com­
plexity by intertrial interval interaction terms. They 
were not significant and they will be discussed together.
These hypotheses were predicted on an assumption 
of "trace decay" with time (Ellis, 1963). Here, as with 
the complexity variable, the longer intervals were ex­
pected to place the greater load on the memory functions. 
The failure of these hypotheses would Seem to bring this 
assumption into question. As can be seen in Figure 2,
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the brain damaged were entirely unaffected.by the inter­
trial interval condition. The controls, on the other 
hand, demonstrated a general tendency for improvement as 
the intertrial interval increased. This was especially 
apparent on the 15 second interval condition. In fact, 
the facultative effect of this interval was so striking 
a Duncan's test was used to test the differences between 
these means. It was demonstrated that there was a sig­
nificant decrement in errors from the 1 second to the 15 
second condition (42 £ < .05). A t-test was also
applied to the group differences at the 15 second inter­
val and this difference was also significant = 2.34, 
df = 28, £ < .05). It is obvious, in spite of the lack 
of statistical significance, there are differential 
group effects on this variable.
The most obvious interpretation of the overall 
effects would appear to lie within the boundaries of 
hypothesized differences in memory storage. The direc­
tion of effects is certainly interactive and suggests 
that the control group was better able to retain the in­
formation presented on a particular trial and apply it 
to subsequent trials. The brain damage group, on the 
other hand, as a possible result of defective storage 
capacity, was not able to maintain the information over 
the time.
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The performance of the control group on the three 
intertrial interval conditions has confirmed, in a strik­
ing manner, some results recently reported by Bourne, Guy, 
Dodd, and Justesen (1965). In an intertrial interval 
condition of the same magnitudes, i,.e., 1, 15, and 29, 
means were obtained that were almost identical with the 
means obtained in this investigation. This finding is 
demonstrated in Figure 5. The striking similarity of 
these means suggested a closer look at the conditions of 
each experiment. It was noticed, for instance, that in 
the Bourne experiment only one level of complexity was 
used: the five level. In the present experiment a
combination of all three levels led to a very similar 
curve. Consequently it was decided to separate the 
three levels of complexity. This led to another striking 
pattern. It can be seen in Figure 5 that in the present 
experiment the 3 level complexity, as well as the combined 
curve, approximated the Bourne, £t ^., (1965) results. 
Interpretation of these results can stress two points,
i.e., (1) the similarity of the absolute number of errors 
and (2) the similarity of pattern. Even if one does not 
choose to grant the significance of the absolute number 
of errors, the similarity of pattern cannot be overlooked. 
It is quite tempting to reflect on the fact that an older 
and less educated group performed on a 3 level complexity
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Fig. 5.--Mean errors for control ^roup separated 
on complexity with comparative data from Bourne, et al., 
1965.
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task practically the same as the younger college group 
did on the 5 level complexity. This finding, at the 
very least, points up the importance of considering 
variables such as age and education when evaluating 
conceptual behavior.
The interpretation of the similar pattern sug­
gests a stability of the effects of the complexity, 
variable on groups free of CNS pathology.
It remains to interpret this stable pattern in 
terms of psychological processes. Bourne, et al, explain 
these findings in the following way:
There are several plausible interpretations of 
facilitation due to lengthened intertrial intervals; 
for example, the interval may provide opportunity: 
to associate characteristics of the stimulus with 
the signaled response category; to rehearse retained 
information; and/or to formulate new hypotheses 
about solution. These possibilities, however, are 
incomplete, since they predict only an asymptote and 
not the deleterious effect observed when intertrial 
intervals exceed 9-17 secs. A second controlling 
process apparently determines the optimizing of per­
formance, but available evidence fails to specify
its source(s) (1965, p. 626).
Within the same publication (Bourne, et , 1965) there
is a suggestion that errors at the longer intertrial in­
tervals are a result of loss of memory. The present 
data in no way contradict this interpretation.
A post-script on this section might be stated 
here in lieu of the previously mentioned perceptual 
deficit hypotheses. It will be recalled that this was
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directed at the performance o£ the brain damaged group 
and involved the proposition that the difficulty was in 
the initial perceptive phase of learning rather than in 
the associative phase. If one accepts the argument that 
the brain damaged are not processing the.stimulus mater­
ial as well and that consequently memory functions are 
not as prominent an issue, then it does not appear 
strange that they are unaffected by various intertrial 
intervals. If information is not being recorded in the 
first place, then any length of interstimulus time is 
completely irrelevant. If, on the other hand, one 
accepts the proposition that the control group are 
processing the incoming information, then an interpre­
tation in terms of memory requirement is appropriate.
Decision Time Data.--One of the original consid­
erations of this experiment was the use of the self 
paced aspect of the experimental design. It was finally 
agreed that a fixed interval arrangement would lead to 
more distortion in terms of the primary questions being 
asked. It was, however, of interest that a record of 
the effect of self pacing was obtained. This was allowed 
by the experimental apparatus and led to another analysis 
of variance with decision time being the dependent vari­
able. It can be noted, however, that this measure has a 
somewhat different interpretative value from error scores
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as it relates to the dimensions involved. With this in 
mind only the significant and more meaningful relation­
ships will be discussed.
The most obvious differences on this comparison 
relate to the significant groups and intertrial interval 
main effects (Figures 3 and 4). No other main effect or 
interaction terms were significant. The significant 
groups effect demonstrates the fact that the brain dam­
aged group had significantly longer decision time scores, 
This finding was expected and, as such, emphasizes the 
group effects in terms of error scores. The brain dam­
aged Ŝ s took longer to decide on their response but 
still performed more poorly on the conceptual task. In 
other words, it is shown that even though the brain dam­
aged group had the advantage of more time in viewing the 
stimulus material, they still did more poorly. In this 
regard it might be reasoned that if the design had used 
a fixed interval procedure the differences in error 
score would have been still greater. And, in terms of 
the hypothesized non-specific perceptual deficit, the 
failure to process the information is even more strik­
ing.
The main effect of the intertrial interval 
demonstrates the tendency for the decision time to 
lengthen as the intertrial interval increased. This
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result confirmed the observation in the testing situa­
tion of the response reaction to the pace of the equip­
ment. This tendency is demonstrated in Figure 4, and 
has some interesting implications. First, it can be 
seen that the brain damaged group are contributing most 
to this relationship. With this in mind one might say 
that the brain damaged as a group are responding in a 
manner that more closely represents the mechanical tim­
ing of the test apparatus. Now if one can view this 
behavior as more concrete, i,.e., they respond more to 
external physical characteristics than to the conceptual 
task, then the behavior has some theoretical import.
That brain damaged groups do behave on a variety of 
tasks in a manner that can be described as "concrete" 
was the theoretical contribution of Kurt Goldstein.
(1939).
Another instance where a brain damaged group is 
seen to respond to the physical aspects of the stimulus 
complexity was in the study by Majumder (1966). In this 
investigation a brain damaged group was unable to 
respond to instructions to ignore an extreme weight 
that was introduced into a series of weights. This was 
in a paired comparison judgment situation. In both 
these instances examples of reacting to the physical 
claims of the environment can be seen.
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Concept Identification and Psychometric Vari­
ables . -Jensen (1966) in a recent discussion o£ individ­
ual differences in concept learning has made an argument 
against the use of psychometric or, as he called them, 
"extrinsic" variables in the explanation of the variance 
observed in concept learning. While the present author 
realizes full well that the correlation coefficient is 
not the end in terms of understanding the phenomena in 
question, it does appear somewhat premature to dispense 
with the fruitful leads and aids to theoretical develop­
ment that correlations provide. Indeed, these correla­
tions many times help establish the concurrent validity 
of the task in question. And, as has been pointed out 
earlier, certain basic data such as age, education, some 
measure of intellectual functioning, etc., are so neces­
sary when studying psychopathologic group that their 
exclusion provides an important basis for rejection of 
results.
Without further justification, the psychometric 
variables used in this experiment will be discussed as 
they relate to the concept identification performance.
The first question that bears consideration is 
the relationship between the measures of intelligence 
and the Cl performance. Psychologists have usually 
worked under the assumption that there is a definite
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relationship between general intelligence and the abili­
ty to solve various conceptual problems (Vinacke, 1951), 
This assumption, however, has not always been substanti­
ated in the concept identification area. In at least 
three studies (Lydecker, Pishkin, § Martin, 1961; Pishkin 
§ Blanchard, 1963; Wolfgang, Pishkin, § Lundy, 1962) 
there was no relationship between the measure of intel­
lectual functioning and concept identification perform­
ance. There were, however, some important differences 
in these studies in terms of subject population and 
measures of intelligence. All three studies used a ver­
bal measure of intelligence as well as employing an age 
restriction. It is suggested that these procedures may 
have limited the possible relationship between intelli­
gence and concept identification (McNemar, 1962, p. 144).
In the present study the relationship between 
the IQ measure and Cl is not unequivocal but there is 
enough to comment on. If the overall correlation is com­
puted there is a significant relationship on the Vocabu­
lary and Block Design Subtest (r = -.26, £ < .01, 
r = -.30, £ < .005, respectively). If, however,.the 
groups are looked at separately, only the Block Design 
subtest in the brain damaged group remained significant 
(r = -.31, £ < .025). This finding is interesting in 
in light of the previous discussion between group differ­
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ences in Cl error scores and Block Design scores. It 
appears that at least with the groups used here the per­
ceptual task used to measure intelligence is the best 
predictor of Cl performance.
Another measure used in this investigation can 
also be discussed in this connection: the abstract
score of the Gorham Proverbs Test. It also was signifi­
cantly correlated when the entire group was considered 
(r = -.28, £ < .005), but when the groups were separated 
only the control group continued to demonstrate a sig­
nificant relationship (r = .25, £ < .05). It seems note­
worthy to mention that in a recent study by Wolfgang £t 
al., (in press) a correlation between the abstract think­
ing (Shipley) score and Cl performance in schizophrenics 
was r = -.28, £ < .05. This is a very similar finding.
In summary, it would appear unwarranted to con­
clude that the intellectual level is not at least one 
predictor of performance in the identification of con­
cepts. It has also been suggested that the best predic­
tor of a particular group's performance may not be the 
same measure of intelligence. In the present study the 
Block Design subtest score was the best predictor for 
the brain damaged while an abstract proverb score was 
the best for the control group. One must also be aware 
of methodological considerations such as restriction of
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range or matching procedures when evaluating correla­
tional data.
Another test used in this experiment to provide 
a clinical measure of memory functioning was the Wechsler 
Memory Scale (WMS). Group differences were quite signif­
icant and supports a limited amount of research with this 
scale (Drachman $ Arbit, 1966; Howard, 1950). When the 
entire group is considered the correlation between the 
WMS and Cl is -.38 (£ < .0005). But, as with the Block 
Design score, when the groups are separated only the 
relationship in the brain damaged group remains signifi­
cant. This finding is difficult to interpret in connec­
tion with the "perceptual deficit" explanation of the 
brain damage performance. This is not, however, to say 
that the deficit observed in the brain damaged group 
need be of only one dimension. Indeed, with different 
levels of complexity the results may well have been in­
terpretable in terms of a memory variable.
Suggestion for Further Research.--One of the 
goals of this project in terms of further work was to 
investigate and evaluate the main experimental variables 
against the characteristics of the groups used. More 
specifically, the question of what level or levels of 
the variables used might lend themselves to use as a 
tool to investigate further very specific questions of
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memory and its role in the identification of concepts.
A consideration of the complexity variable does not 
allow a definite conclusion. The failure of the groups 
by complexity interaction term revealed that the brain 
damaged did equally poorly on all levels of complexity, 
so that within the limitations of this experiment it 
would seem the use of any of the 3 levels of complexity 
might equally reveal differences between the groups used. 
Each level appears equally difficult for the brain dam­
aged when compared to the control performance. One 
possible factor in this finding is inadequacy of the 
assumption of a demonstrable memory impairment in some 
of these patients. It was, for instance, realized that 
many patients would not demonstrate a memory deficit by 
any measure; It was hoped that these patients would be 
few and not affect greatly the overall results. And the 
very practical consideration of lack of availability of 
brain damaged subjects accents the possibility of a few 
of these patients affecting the results. The hetero­
geneity inherent in any measure using psychopathologic 
groups is well documented and requires particular meth­
odological considerations. It is for this reason that 
the next step should entail the use of patients highly 
selected in terms of locus of lesion. In this way the 
within group variance can be cut down, which may well
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lead to a more unequivocal demonstration o£ the relation­
ship o£ memory capacity and the complexity dimension.
And in context with this more specialized design 
it would seem advisable to use the 15 second intertrial 
interval condition. The reasoning is that this appears 
to be best in re£lecting group di££erences. 0£ course, 
this assumes that one is no longer interested in manipu­
lating this variable £urther. I£ one is, however, there 
are some suggestions that can be made.
It would have been interesting, £or instance, to 
have started with the 15 second interval point and ex­
tended to a minute. This would appear to be a better 
test o£ the decay phenomena £or now one would be starting 
at the point o£ maximum '.'rehearsal" (£or this group as 
well as a college group) and going toward the point o£ 
maximum "inter£erence." This would eliminate the perhaps 
con£using e££ect o£ the rapid 1 second intertrial inter­
val condition. That this condition is complicated by 
reactions to the equipment is very apparent.
In summary, it has been demonstrated that the 
variables used in this experiment do con£irm to an im­
pressing degree the previous work. That every prediction 
in the present design was not con£irmed should not dis­
suade the attempt to £urther investigate conceptual 
activity with this task. In £act, in addition to these
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variables the whole gamut of concept identification 
variables should be applied to these groups. That this 
will lead to a better understanding of pathological as 




The value o£ standardized procedures as well as 
the quantiflability of various dimensions has long been 
recognized as desirable ends for scientific investiga­
tion of conceptual processes. With these fundamental 
assumptions in mind the present investigation has 
attempted to;
1. Extend the generalizability of the concept 
identification model by investigating the complexity 
and intertrial interval variables on a brain damaged 
and matched control population.
2. Show that variations among these two varia­
bles are consistent with assumed differences in 
memory storage capacity of the two groups.
3. Demonstrate that concept identification is to 
some extent concerned with the same processes that 
are involved in general intellectual functioning.
The rationale of this experiment was that one of 
the many affects of brain lesions is an impairment of 
memory functions. This assumption is well documented in 
the clinical literature on a number of types of lesions 
if not the whole range of cerebral injury. It is recog­
nized that many variables such as type and location of 
lesion, severity and chronicity of injury, as well as 
the intellectual level of the patient all must be con-
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sidered as. a source of variance that can influence the 
outcome. Indeed, it was recognized that some of the 
brain damaged patients would demonstrate no memory loss 
from any measure employed. It was, however, necessary 
to make the assumption in the interest of the design in 
relation to the availability of brain damaged subjects.
This was a factorial design replicated on brain 
damage and control groups, levels of complexity, and 
intertrial intervals. The procedure consisted of the 
concept identification test followed by the administra­
tion of the following psychometric tests: the Wechsler
Memory Scale; the Vocabulary.and Block Design subtests 
of the WAIS; the Gorham Proverbs Test (best answer form) 
and a short self report measure of motivation (Hoepfner, 
et £l. j 1964). The order of administration in each 
patient was the same.
The subjects for this investigation were ninety 
patients from the Veterans Administration Hospital, 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The brain damaged patients 
were selected initially on the basis of the presence of 
positive neurological signs by the E and later rated by 
a staff neurologist as to the presence and locus of CNS 
damage. The control patients were selected from the 
same hospital and were also rated by the neurologist as 
being without CNS damage. Each patient was individually
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seen.by the present investigator and the average testing 
time was between one and one-half and two hours.
The results generally supported the previously 
mentioned aims. The substantiation of previous work re­
flected itself in three aspects of the analysis; the 
groups main effect, the complexity main effect, and the 
groups by complexity interaction term. In the first 
instance there is a demonstration that the brain damaged 
do significantly poorer on the identification of con­
cepts. This was an expected finding and it demonstrates 
that deficits in brain damaged groups can be shown.
Only with adequate experimental procedures can separa­
tion of the complexities of conceptual processes be 
accomplished. The second aspect that was most reflec­
tive of the mathematical model was the complexity main 
effect. In this instance the linear nature of its 
effect was significant. This result adds another study 
to the already large body of work that has consistently 
demonstrated the linear nature of this variable. It is 
indeed remarkable to find an experimental variable that 
can be applied with such consistent effects across so 
many different groups.
The final result relates to performance across 
the intertrial intervals. Even though the main effect 
was insignificant, the groups by intervals did demon­
strate some differential effect. In the control group
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there was observed a general facilitation in performance 
as the intertrial interval increased. This effect was 
not without precedent, for in a study by Bourne, et al., 
(1965) using the same intervals, the curves are virtually 
the same. It was pointed out, however, that in the 
Bourne study only the 5 level complexity was used; A 
consequent separation of the complexity levels in the 
present study revealed the 3 level complexity again 
approximating the Bourne curve. The discussion of this 
finding centered around the similarity of interval 
effects as well as an explanation of this effect in 
terms of a "rehearsal" phenomenon that becomes comprom­
ised as the intertrial interval approaches 29 seconds.
The interference was concluded to be one of memory loss. 
And, it was also pointed out that the brain damaged, 
possibly being without the memory capacity that would 
allow "rehearsal" would not show the facilitative effect 
of increasing intertrial intervals. This was indeed the 
case as the brain damaged showed absolutely no facilita­
tive effect.
The analysis of variance on decision time led to 
a consideration of the groups and intertrial interval 
main effect. In the groups effect the brain damaged 
were found to take significantly longer to decide on a 
response. This was interpreted as an emphasis of
85
original error score difference, i..£., the brain damaged 
were exposed to the stimulus material longer but still 
were deficient in the identification of concepts.
The significant intertrial effect on this depen­
dent measure indicated that the longer intertrial inter­
vals elicited longer decision times. This effect was 
pointed out to the most obvious in the brain damaged 
group and the interpretation was presented in Goldstein- 
ian terms. This approach points out the tendency of 
brain injured to react more to the external physical 
stimulus situation than controls. This tendency was con­
ceived as "concrete” and as such reflects a lack of 
capacity to deal on a conceptual level (in this case, 
the solution of the conceptual problem) with aspects 
other than those making immediate perceptual decisions.
The third question concerning the relationship 
between measured intelligence and Cl performance was 
handled by psychometric variables. In the brain damaged 
the correlative relationship between Vocabulary and 
Block Design measures, while positive in both was only 
significant in the Block Design score. This indicates 
that this Block Design score is the best predictor of 
conceptual identification performance in the brain dam­
aged. In the control group, however, the abstract score 
of the Gorham Proverbs Test was the only significant
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predictor. The major conclusion here was that it would 
be difficult to say there was no relationship between 
measured psychometric intelligence and concept identifi­
cation performance. It was pointed out, however, that 
the relationship was contingent upon the tests and the 
groups. This finding would seem to indicate that some 
caution is necessary in making generalizations about 
broader concepts based on a particular measure of in­
telligence; It seems possible in some groups a verbally 
loaded measure of intelligence might be the best pre­
dictor of concept identification performance while in 
others, it may be a spatially loaded measure. It was 
also the purpose of this investigation to help in the 
ongoing process of investigating conceptual behavior 
from the standpoint of group characteristics as well as 
with different measuring instruments.
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Criteria for Brain Damaged Group
All patients tested ;were selected as belonging in 
one of the following eight categories:
1. Tumor or operation.
2. Cerebral aneurysm.
3. CVÀ, with possible neurological findings.
4. Head injury, with positive neurological find­
ings.




8. Cortical atrophy (Alzheimer and Pick's 
disease).
NOTE: A history of seizures even with positive BEG was
not considered sufficient evidence for inclusion in this 
group.
Criteria for Control Group
The control group was selected on the basis of 
being free from the following conditions:






7. Long-standing and uncontrolled diabetes.
8. Longrstanding and uncontrolled hypertension.
9. Chronic, severe, cortical difficulties.
10. Chronic, severe, lung difficulties.
11. Chronic, severe, renal difficulties.
12. Severe endocrine disturbances.















































































Birth t r a u m a ____
Penetrating head injury__ 
Closed head injury




Degenerative or Demyelinating Disease: 
Multiple sclerosis______  Anemia
Alzheimer's disease_  Metabolic disease
Pick's disease__________  Cerebral atrophy_]




















4 T LF 29 12 3
5 CVA LFT 58 5 204
6 CVA LFP 54 9 7
8 Tr LFT 22 11 8
12 Tr FRP 53 12 3
15 Tr EILAT 34 9 212
17 I LPO 50 14 214
18 CVA RLO 55 8 54
20 Tr EILAT 33 7 8
22 CVA RFP 46 3 4
27 T RP 40 7 3
28 CVA RFT 46 16 17
29 T RP 40 12 2
30 Tr LFP 42 12 4
31 DE GEN SUECOR 47 9 32
32 INFECT LP 31 12 78
36 CVA FRP 56 6 2
39 . CVA LP 47 9 2
46 Tr LFP 37 12 24
47 CVA LFTP 56 15 2
49 ATYP EILAT 54 12 31
52 CVA LFT 70 10 16
53 CVA LF 70 6 1
54 T RF 54 12 1
57 Tr SUECOR 48 12 108
58 Tr RTF 35 12 91
59 T LF 38 12 114
62 T LFP 55 7 30
63 T RFP 62 7 1
106











70 Tr LFP 44 8 261
71 CVA LFT 34 11 43
72 CVA RF . 63 8 3
73 Tr LFTP 56 10 49
74 T RT 52-- 4 4
78 Tr RFP 46 15 2
79 ATYP RP 43 10 86
81 CVA RF 29 9 105
83 Tr LFT 36 8 10
88 Tr RT 31 12 97
95 Tr BILAT 29 13 77
100 INFLAM SUBCOR 45 10 2
101 T SUBCOR 43 8 73
102 DEGEN LFT 50 16 7
103 CVA RFTP 56 13 4
107 CVA LFT 46 14 53
®CVA = cerebral vascular disease (hemmorrhage, 
aneurysm, etc.); T = Tumor; Tr = Trauma; INFLAM = In­
flammatory disease; DEGEN = Degenerative Disease;
= Left; R = Right; EILAT = Bilateral; D = 
Diffuse; F = Frontal; T = Temporal; P = Parietal; 0 = 
Occipital; SUBCOR = Sobcortical.
APPENDIX IV
PRESENTATION ORDER, DEMOGRAPHIC, PSYCHOMETRIC, 
ERROR, DECISION TIME, AND LATERALITY DATA
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Order of Testing
Complexity 1 3 5
Intertrial
Interval 1 15 29 1 15 29 1 15 29
Brain Damage
12 20 5 18 6 4 8 15-—  95
17 103 30 29 27 32 28 52 22
Repli­
cations 46 47 54 31 49 39 36 58 107
101 62 102 100 57 53 63 88 59
74~ 81 71 83 79 70 78 73 72
Control
108 9 93 11 90 2 13 10 1
16 33 25 35 106 97 37 24 21
Repli­
cations 50 41 42 51 44 43 55 105 38
80 64 92 67 77 109 76 66 65
91 75 104 87 85 86 89 99 82
108
Age
Complexity 1 3 5
Intertrial
Interval 1 15 29 1 15 29 1 15 29
Brain Damage
53 33 38 55 54 29 22 34 29
SO 56 42 40 40 31 46 70 46
Repli­
cations •37 57 54 47 54 47 56 35 46
43 55 50 45 48 70 62 31 38
52 29 34 36 43 44 46 56 63
Control
49 46 61 32 29 39 39 34 25
Repli­ 59 44 44 45 57 52 51 47 53
cations 42 42 37 60 59 53 55 57 48
33 59 40 52 40 39 47 42 44
54 38 50 36 54 39 39 41 44
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Education
Complexity, 1 3 5
Intertrial
Interval 1 15 29 1 15 29 1 15 29
Brain Damage
12 8 5 8 9 12 11 9 13
14 13 12 12 7 12 16 10 3
Repli­
cations 12 15 12 9 12 9 6 12 14
8 7 16 10 12 6 7 12 12
4 9 11 8 10 8 15 10 8
Control
4 12 7 11 9 4 10 14 17
8 16 14 12 12 14 4 6 7
Repli­
cations 10 8 8 5 6 8 12 7 8
11 7 9 8 10 6 7 12 12
14 7 14 13 12 14 16 12 4
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Wechsler Memory Scale
Complexity 1 3 5
Intertrial
Interval 1 15 29 1 15 29 1 15 29
Brain Damage
80 73 57 64 80 90 55 57 79
70 100 58 94 59 69 58 99 72
Repli­
cations 90 64 99 63 118 101 77 132 64
• • 99 49 92 70 92 92 84 59
77 92 81 73 61 89 99 55 96
Control
66 96 100 84 106 94 86 103 97
96 101 87 99 83 108 77 74 103
Repli­
cations 92 93 64 80 87 108 96 106 94
80 90 110 89 100 93 93 83 90
110 : 27 114 126 110 100 116 101 76
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Vocabulary Score: Age Scaled
Complexity. 1 3 . 5
Intertrial
Interval 1 15 29 1 15 29 1 15 29
Brain Damage
7 8 6 6 7 9 7 1 11
9 Ï3 2 12 5 8 2 12 8Repli­
cations 10 5 13 8 11 10 7 13 2
7 9 9 4 10 9 10 0
3 8 9 5 7 7 13 2 13
Control
3 10 7 7 8 6 12 16 10
9 12 12 6 11 11 7 7 6Repli­
cations 6 9 5 7 8 13 11 8 8
7 7 6 7 11 8 12 9 12
7 6 13 12 11 8 12 10 6
112
Block Design Score: Age Scaled
Complexity 1 3 5
Intertrial
Interval 1 15 29 1 15 29 1 15 29
Brain Damage
6 0 0 7 8 11 10 6 9
12 6 7 9 0 8 7 12 6Repli­
cations 11 10 9 7 10 10 7 9 10
• • 10 9 9 9 8 8 7 8
9 5 10 6 0 9 5 0 4
Control
10 12 8 11 9 8 11 15 14
11 12 8 9 6 10 6 14 12
Repli­
cations 9 9 7 8 7 16 9 11 9
9 8 10 9 14 11 9 11 11
14 10 11 13 13 7 15 9 6
113
Full Scale Estimate: Age Scaled
Complexity 1 3 5
Intertrial
Interval 1 15 29 1 15 29 1 15 29
Brain Damage
13 8 6 13 15 20 17 7 20
21 19 9 21 5 16 9 24 14
Repli­
cations 21 15 22 15 21 20 14 22 12
• • 17 18 18 13 18 17 17 8
12 13 19 11 7 16 18 2 17
Control
13 22 15 18 17 14 23 31 24
20 24 20 15 17 21 13 21 18
Repli­
cations 15 18 12 15 15 29 20 19 17
16 15 16 16 25 19 21 20 23
21 16 24 . 25 24 15 27 19 12
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Gorham Proverbs Test; Abstract Score
Complexity 1 3 5
Intertrial
Interval 1 15 29 1 15 29 1 15 29
Brain Damage
12 13 6 4 24 7 11 8 25
lb 26 7 29 15 20 7 23 17
Repli­
cations 24 13 24 6 19 30 5 32 13
8 • • 26 13 9 23 33 6
7 24 20 8 12 18 29 10 15
Control
15 22 14 14 14 13 27 33 34
12 31 24 14 19 24 8 19 9
Repli­
cations 16 16 25 16 18 24 26 13 19
10 9 16 8 26 23 35 18 36
24 13 33 . 27 29 18 29 28 9
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Motivation Scale
Complexity 1 3 5
Intertrial
Interval 1 15 29 1 IS 29 1 15 29
Brain Damage
2 4 2 2 2 2 4 3 3
6 3 2 4 6 5 2 3 4Repli­
cations 2 2 2 2 5 4 6 5 2
• • 2 10 - 4 2 2 2 2 3
3 2 2 2 5 2 4 4 3
Control
6 4 4 2 2 5 5 2 5
2 3 3 6 5 3 3 2 2Repli­
cations 2 2 4 2 4 3 3 3 2
5 2 8 4 2 2 6 5 3




Complexity 1 3 5
Intertrial
Interval 1 15 29 1 15 29 1 15 29
Brain Damage
71 74 69 60 4 8 71 64 72
63 7 28 3 67 67 66 63 71Repli­
cations 28 48 2 69 26 65 55 71 59
6 6 60 21. 73 63 64 71 69
5 33 8 60 67 38 60 62 63
Control
59 3 8 41 54 71 12 70 67
13 1 18 54 59 3 61 13 60Repliç', ... ; 
cations 82 2 5 65 2 15 63 69 60
30 1 66 70 17 57 50 71 13








15 29 1 15 29 1 15 29
Brain Damage





















1.36 1.76 2.48 3.52 3.76 4.24 3.32 2.92 12.80
1.96 5.32 4.68 4.96 2.32 3.04 4.88 5.56 2.76
Control





















3.60 2.08 2.20 2.04 1.56 10.28 4.28 2.92 2.60
2.28 3.68 1.68 2.28 1.88 2.32 2.20 2.08 3.12
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Right/Left Hemisphere
Complexity 1 3 5
Intertriai
Interval 1 15 29 1 IS 29 1 15 29
Brain Damage
R • 4 L L L L • « • #
L R L R R R R L R
Repli­
cations L L R L R R L
• • L L L R R L
R R L L R L R L R
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